


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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## REALISM—NOT HYSTERIA—NEEDED TO MEET EUROPE'S PROBLEMS

THE announcement on October 5 that an "informational conference" of representatives of the Communist parties of nine countries—the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France and Italy—had been held in Poland at the end of September brought to a new climax the "cold war" raging between the United States and Russia. While this development was interpreted abroad as a revival of the Third (Communist) International established by Lenin in Moscow in 1919 and dissolved by Stalin in 1943, the October 5 announcement merely stated that an Information Bureau composed of the representatives of the Central Committees of the nine participating parties would be set up in Belgrade. The tasks of this Bureau are to consist "in the organization of an exchange of experience between parties and, in case of necessity, in coordination of their activity on the basis of mutual agreement." Since then some of the UN delegates from Eastern European countries have compared the new Bureau to the Headquarters of the Second (Socialist) International in London that serves as a clearinghouse for the Socialist parties of the world, the strongest of which are those of Britain, France, Italy and Germany.

**ACCENT ON NATIONALISM.** More significant than the announcement of the Information Bureau is the manifesto made public by the conference. Compared to the ringing eloquence of the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels issued nearly a century ago, the document prepared by the conference in Poland has something of the staleness of oft-repeated denunciations that characterized Vishinsky's attack on the United States in the UN General Assembly. The United States is again denounced for its alleged imperialism and anti-democratic tendencies; other nations are warned that the Marshall

plan threatens their sovereignty and national independence; and right-wing Socialists are blasted as "faithful toadies" of the "imperialists, bringing within the ranks of labor dissension and disruption and poisoning its conscience." Two aspects of this manifesto should be particularly noted. The first is the stress laid on nationalism, in contrast to the Lenin-Trotsky ideals of international revolution. Now it is the right-wing Socialists who are accused of endangering "national honor and independence." The other aspect is concern that the working class may underestimate its own strength and overestimate "the force of the imperialist camp," and thus succumb to a new Munich. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the Communist parties of European countries outside Russia have by no means displayed a "monolithic" cohesion in recent months. Internal differences have been reported, for example, between more moderate and more extreme leaders—notably between Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos in France, and Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo in Italy. Notable, too, is the fact that it is the more extreme leaders—Jacques Duclos and Luigi Longo—who represented the Communist parties of France and Italy at the conference in Poland.

*How does American occupation policy in Korea differ from that of Russia? Why is it urgent that Korean unity be restored? What are the prospects for an American-Russian settlement on Korea?*

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by GEORGE M. McCUNE

25 cents

October 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS  
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*Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.*

**CAUSES AND EFFECTS.** Although the Soviet government was careful to dissociate itself from the conference, news of which was published in Russian Communist party organs but not in the government organ, *Izvestia*, no one doubts that the inspiration for the meeting came from Moscow, which sent two of the outstanding party leaders of the U.S.S.R., Andrei Zhdanov and Georgi Melenkov, both frequently mentioned as possible successors to Stalin. Two questions are therefore being asked on all sides: Why did Moscow decide, at this particular moment, to revive, if not yet the elaborate world structure of the Comintern of the inter-war years, at least its token replica in Europe? And what will be the consequences of this decision?

Any answers must at best be speculative. There is considerable evidence, however, that the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, at the height of World War II, was genuine in the sense that the continued existence of official organizational links between Communist parties, which had served a useful purpose during the period when Russia was an outlaw from world society, had become a liability at a time when Russia was fighting side by side with the Western powers which its leaders had been wont to denounce as "capitalist" and "imperialist." True, Russia did not enter the war in order to save the Western world; but neither did the United States and Britain enter the war to save Russia. The problem that continues to perplex contemporary historians is whether the degree of cooperation achieved by West and East in time of war could, under favorable circumstances, have been carried over into the post-war period. From the point of view of the United States, the deterioration in relations, which has now reached an acute stage of mutual exasperation, is due to the aggressiveness and expansionist ambitions of Russia. From the point of view of Moscow, it is due to the growth of "reactionary" sentiment in the United States since the death of President Roosevelt.

**STRENGTH OF SOCIALISM.** At the present time there are elements of both weakness and strength in the position of Russia and of communism in Europe. On Russia's debit side is the fact, attested to by well-informed Western observers, that the tide of Communist influence, which reached a peak at the end of the war, appears to be receding as peoples slowly recover from the shocks of war and civil strife and begin to rebuild their economies. Today most human beings, including the Russians, hope for two things above all—to avert another war, and to obtain a minimum of food, clothing and shelter. This mood, profoundly different from militant resistance to the Nazis in which the Communists of all countries, following the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, played an important part with

fierce determination and striking discipline, is not favorable to the continuance of revolutionary changes. It is a mood that may well have caused militant Communists to fear that the working class might reach a compromise with the moderate forces of socialism and Christian socialism.

The United States has had the opportunity, so far only slightly utilized, to take advantage of this weakness of Russia and communism by displaying genuine concern for the needs of the working class in Europe, and by trying to understand the significance of socialism in Britain and on the continent. Instead, our failure to understand that capitalism of the American type did not exist in Europe, and our resulting doubts about Socialist programs have left the field clear for Communist propaganda against socialism, which has thus been caught in a cross-fire between the United States and Russia. Yet socialism still has a fighting chance of becoming an important middle of the road political formation committed neither to American capitalism nor to Russian communism.

The element of strength for Russia and communism has been the rise to power of Communist parties in several countries, chiefly in Eastern Europe, whose pre-war economic and social conditions created a climate conducive to revolution. This success, however, has been by no means unalloyed. The opposition which Communists have encountered from Socialist and Peasant parties even in countries within the Russian orbit; taken together with their exclusion from the cabinets of Ramadier and de Gasperi, must have seemed to them a warning of further defeats in store. Yet even this warning might not have led to revival of official cooperation between Communist parties had not the United States thrown its weight into the balance against both Russia and communism—first with the Truman Doctrine, then with the Marshall plan. The decision of the United States to check both Russia and communism confronted the Soviet government with the prospect of a setback reminiscent of that which it suffered in its early days after World War I, when, following the flare-up of revolutions in Hungary, Bavaria and China, Europe and Asia turned—not, as it happened, to expanded democracy—but to militant nazism and fascism. Today the United States, in contrast to 1919 when, although abhorring communism, it followed an isolationist course, is in the vanguard of the anti-Communist struggle—and has therefore become the chief target for Communist attack.

**WEAPONS OF U.S. AND RUSSIA.** In this struggle, assuming it does not develop into a fighting war, the most effective weapons are in the hands of this country, if only it decides to use them to their full value. The Russians are adept at propaganda.

But Americans, who have made a fine art of advertising, are perfectly capable of outmatching the Russians in this field—provided that Congress, which pared down appropriations for the "Voice of America" at its last session, is willing to spend the necessary amount for this purpose. More important, however, than government propaganda would be the opportunity for Europeans, who after the claustrophobia of the war years are hungry for information about the United States, to obtain American books, magazines and newspapers which today cannot be purchased because of lack of dollars. Voluntary donations of material by publishers, magazine editors and newspaper owners to American government libraries abroad as well as to European libraries would go a long way in counteracting Russian propaganda. Equally effective would be the enlargement of college and university grants for study here by foreign students, whose numbers have dwindled alarmingly, again owing to currency difficulties, at a time when Russia offers full scholarships especially to students from Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

The United States also has effective weapons in its incomparably strong industrial system, and in its capacity to provide at least some of the foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactured goods urgently needed for European reconstruction. Secretary of State Marshall has wisely urged aid to Europe. Such aid should be rendered as promptly as possible, and not merely because it may save Europe from communism, but because it would help Europe to restore its physical and moral forces, tragically depleted by two world wars and a great depression. Russia, itself devastated by war, and still backward industrially as compared with the Western nations, has little to offer for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—and its weakness in this respect is one of the principal reasons for its exasperated denunciations of the Marshall plan and of "dollar diplomacy." Yet Russia is determined to challenge the United States in this field too—as indicated by reports that, in response to a request made by France in August, it had offered to send wheat to France on the eve of the French municipal elections to be held on October 19 and 26. Previously, when French Communists had urged Foreign Minister Bidault to turn from the United States to Russia and seek food from Moscow, M. Bidault had to answer that the Russians, like the Americans, wanted to be paid for their wheat in dollars, and that since dollars were unobtainable in Russia, the United States was a preferable source of purchases. On October 10, however, it was reported that the Soviet government was ready to send wheat on a barter basis in exchange for French manufactured products.

**OUR AID THE TEST.** The struggle between the United States and Russia for the future of Europe is thus being fought both on a material and a propaganda plane. Europeans, however, are weary of all political slogans, and of whatever may be interpreted as foreign intervention in their affairs. The real test will be the degree of efficacy and disinterestedness of the aid the United States and Russia can offer Europe. The new Communist manifesto has already had the effect in this country of strengthening Congressional and public support for the grant of stopgap aid to Europe and the adoption of the long-term Marshall plan. If Congress promptly votes adequate funds, then the United States will have won a victory over Russia without resort to atomic bombs, and with ultimately constructive results for the entire continent. If, however, the calculated hysteria of Mr. Vishinsky and other Communist spokesmen is answered here only by comparable hysteria without adequate aid to Europe, then Russia, in turn, without striking a military blow, will have won a victory over the United States. What we must firmly bear in mind is that mere defeat of Russia and communism would not of itself resolve the fundamental problems of Europe. Never before has it been so important to heed the kind of advice given by Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett on October 8, when he said: "For Americans, this is a time for coolness and clarity of judgment. We must not allow ourselves to be deflected from the course we have chosen; and we must continue to study with sympathy but with calm realism the problem of how Europe can be assisted to regain its proper place in a stable and peaceful world." Realism, however, should include plans for restoration here of rationing and price controls; and should not exclude renewed negotiations with Russia for economic cooperation in Europe. **VERA MICHELES DEAN**

*Speaking Frankly*, by James F. Byrnes. New York, Harper, 1947. \$3.50

This is unquestionably the most absorbing book on American foreign policy published since the war. The former Secretary of State records with candor and with refreshing good humor the historic negotiations in which he participated at Yalta, Potsdam, London, Paris, Moscow and New York. He makes no bones about the difficulties and frustrations of his negotiations with the Russians, but at the same time points out many of the handicaps under which an American Secretary of State now labors in formulating and carrying out an over-all foreign policy adequate to this country's new role as a great world power with interests all over the globe. Both for the general reader and for the historian this book is an invaluable source of information on events of which we do not yet have a complete official record.

*A History of Russia*, by Sir Bernard Pares. Fifth edition, New York, Knopf, 1947. \$5.00

This valuable book, by the most distinguished British authority in the field, is brought up to 1947 in an excellent revised and enlarged edition.

## PALESTINE PARTITION LIKELY FOLLOWING U.S. AND SOVIET APPROVAL

Settlement of the Palestine problem through partition of the Holy Land into separate Jewish and Arab states has now become a distinct likelihood. For substantial accord between the United States and Russia on the division of Palestine removes this issue from the existing area of disagreement in which so many questions are hotly debated at Lake Success. What is perhaps most striking about this example of Soviet-American accord is its very uniqueness. Many competent students of international affairs have long recognized that the Palestine issue, in all its ramifications, presents one of the most tragic, yet confused problems facing the great powers. It is in keeping with its unique character that the Palestine controversy should provide the occasion for even an isolated instance of Russian-American cooperation. It is to be noted, however, that this agreement symbolizes the type of mutual accommodation needed to break the deadlock in other conflicts between Washington and Moscow.

**U.S.S.R. FAVORS ECONOMIC UNITY.** While both the Soviet statement on Palestine, made before the UN General Assembly's special committee on October 13, and that of the United States on October 11, agree in substance on partition, the American delegate, Herschel V. Johnson, used the phrase "in principle" in approving the plan for separate Jewish and Arab states. Both countries it is evident have wrestled with the diverse factors involved in the tangled Palestine situation. And the Washington administration as well as the government in Moscow make it unmistakably clear that their decisions embody not the best possible solution, but perhaps the only solution in view of the increasing tension and danger of open warfare in the Holy Land.

Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, noted Russia's preference for a unified Arab-Jewish state. But, as Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet representative on the Security Council, indicated last spring, if a bi-national state in Palestine proved to be impossible, his country would favor partition. The Soviet government has not only announced that it will wish to examine most carefully the details of partition and the boundaries to be established between the two states, but Tsarapkin also laid special emphasis on Russia's approval of the plan for economic union between the two proposed countries in Palestine. He stated that such unity could pave the way in the future for closer political relations between Arabs and Jews.

**U.S. PROPOSES POLICE FORCE.** By accepting in principle the majority report on partition submitted to the present UN General Assembly, the United States also approved the plan for economic unity. Johnson, however, did not emphasize this point. Like the Russian delegate, the American representative suggested that certain geographical modifications would be necessary in setting the boundaries of the new states. In the American view, Jaffa, for example, should be included in the Arab state because it is predominantly an Arab city. Other modifications or amendments to the partition scheme which Washington may favor were not disclosed.

Having approved partition and thus broken this country's long silence on any definite policy toward Palestine, Johnson then turned with unusual candor to the problem of implementing the decision which the United States hopes the General Assembly will adopt. He declared that the United States is willing to assist Palestine in meeting its economic and financial problems through a UN program. Washington has also sought to meet the crucial issue of carrying out a Palestine solution by proposing that a police force be established to provide order in Palestine during the transition period. Such a constabulary or police force might be recruited on a volunteer basis under the UN auspices, Johnson said.

Recent threats from the surrounding Arab states that they would oppose by force any division of Palestine if recommended by the UN were met squarely by the United States. Noting that this government was offering to participate in a UN program for aid to Palestine, Johnson said that "we do not refer to the possibility of violations by any member of its obligations to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. We assume that there will be Charter observance." After Johnson spoke at Lake Success, Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hinted that Congressional approval may not be given for such a voluntary military force. But while Vandenberg's attitude raises a very serious question, which may well become a major domestic political issue, the United States has clearly assessed the difficulties involved in settling the Palestine problem. Only by continuing to demonstrate the type of realism and statesmanship revealed in the October 11 American statement can the Palestine controversy be brought to a successful conclusion.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

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